
Link to the CTF challenge on TryHackMe: Overheard at Breakfast
Concierge Briefing
The breakfast terrace is loud this morning, clinking cutlery, espresso machines, the usual chatter. One guest couldn't help but linger at a nearby table, seeing more of a conversation than they were meant to.
When the table's occupant stepped away for a refill, they seized the moment and grabbed a screenshot before it could disappear. Somewhere in that conversation is enough to track down an account nobody was supposed to find.
TODAY'S ITINERARY
[ ] Analyze the provided conversation for identifying details
[ ] Extract the relevant clues
[ ] Locate the hidden account
[ ] Submit the flag
OSINT
Social Media
Hashing
The above image was attached to the challenge. This is an OSINT challenge; we're supposed to use the screenshot to help us find any information that can lead us to the flags. From the screenshot, we can see the email and a little information about Lambo, their avatar (people tend to reuse one on different platforms), and the fact that they're visiting the resort.
From a previous OSINT challenge, I learned about this platform called epieos, where you can search emails and find some OSINT information
checked epieos
lambobytelotushotel@gmail.com2 results(7.8 seconds)Mon, 03 Aug 2026 12:40:35 GMT!Epieos logo
Google account finder will show you if the requested email is linked to a Google account and/or if the person left reviews on Google Maps.
img/profile/fake/vonneumann.jpg
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109541557676124188877
1777-04-30
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https://www.google.com/maps/contrib/109541557676124188877
https://calendar.google.com/calendar/u/0/embed?src=lambobytelotushotel@gmail.comCopy URL
https://web.archive.org/web//plus.google.com/109541557676124188877Copy URL
- This tool allows you to find a gravatar account linked to an email address.
img/profile/fake/euler.jpg
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314159265359
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https://example.com/longhiddenlink
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Edsger Wybe Dijkstra
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Carl Friedrich Gauss
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Leonhard Euler
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Transia
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echo -n "lambobytelotushotel@gmail.com" | md5sum
d4a5fc5d3128890778667e24617d7cc0 -
curl -s https://api.gravatar.com/3/profiles/d4a5fc5d3128890778667e24617d7cc0
{
"errors": {
"error": "Unsupported version"
}
}%
curl -s https://www.gravatar.com/d4a5fc5d3128890778667e24617d7cc0.json
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}\n" "https://www.gravatar.com/avatar/d4a5fc5d3128890778667e24617d7cc0?d=404"
200
Conclusion
Overheard at Breakfast is a clean example of OSINT correlation through identifier reuse: no exploitation, no injection, just patient pivoting from one leaked data point (a screenshot) through multiple public services that all key off the same underlying identifier: the email address.
What the investigation demonstrates
A single email address is a surprisingly strong pivot point across unrelated services. Once
lambobytelotushotel@gmail.comwas visible in the screenshot, it became the key that unlocked multiple independent OSINT surfaces:Epieos → Google account correlation: confirmed the email is tied to an active Google account (numeric Google ID
109541557676124188877), exposed a Google Maps contributor profile, and even surfaced a Wayback Machine snapshot of a defunct Google+ profile - showing that deleted platforms can still leak identifying data years later via archives.Gravatar lookup: the same email, MD5-hashed, resolves to an avatar image - Gravatar's whole design assumes the hash of your email is a safe, non-reversible identifier to expose publicly, which OSINT tooling routinely disproves in practice.
Gravatar's hash-as-identifier model is a privacy weak point, not a security control. MD5 of a known/guessed email is instant to compute (
echo -n "..." | md5sum), and Gravatar's own API confirms whether that hash has a registered account (200 OKon/avatar/<hash>?d=404means "this hash has a real avatar," not the default fallback). This turns "does this email have a Gravatar" into a simple oracle - useful for OSINT, but also a reminder that MD5-of-email is not obfuscation; it's a lookup key anyone can compute offline.API versioning matters when chaining tools. The
api.gravatar.com/3/profiles/<hash>call returned"Unsupported version"- a good practical lesson that public OSINT APIs change their versioned endpoints over time, and a failed call doesn't necessarily mean the target has no data; it can mean the wrong API version/endpoint was hit. The correct next step is checking Gravatar's current documented endpoint (their v1/v3 profile API has shifted) rather than concluding the lookup dead-ends there.Avatar reuse is a durable correlation signal. The briefing's own hint "people tend to reuse one avatar across platforms" is exactly how a defender or investigator pivots from "an email in a screenshot" to "this person's accounts elsewhere," and it's equally exactly how an attacker doing reconnaissance on a real target would work. Reverse image search on a distinctive avatar (TinEye, Google Lens, PimEyes-class tools) is normally the next move here, in addition to hash-based lookups.
Security takeaways
Screenshots leak more than intended. The entire chain started from someone glimpsing a screen over someone's shoulder ("shoulder surfing") and capturing an email address: a reminder that visible-on-screen data in public spaces (cafes, terraces, shared workspaces, video calls) is a real reconnaissance vector, not a theoretical one.
Email addresses should be treated as quasi-PII even when "just an email." A single address, once known, chains into: real name (via Google account/Maps reviews), Gravatar-hosted avatar and possibly bio/social links, and historical presence on now-defunct platforms via web archives. Anyone provisioning accounts (guest wifi portals, hotel apps, loyalty programs) should assume the email itself is enough to start building a profile of the person.
Deleted ≠ gone. The Wayback Machine snapshot of a defunct Google+ profile is the clearest example: platform shutdown doesn't remove archived exposure. Any takedown/deletion request only addresses the live platform, not third-party archives.
MD5(email) is not a privacy-preserving identifier. Any system using a hash of a well-known, guessable, or breach-leaked field (email, username) as a "safe" public key is exposed to exactly this kind of dictionary/rainbow lookup. This applies to Gravatar by design, but the same anti-pattern shows up in other systems that hash predictable inputs and assume that's sufficient obfuscation.
Loosely mapped to attacker tradecraft (MITRE ATT&CK / PRE-ATT&CK framing, since this simulates recon against a target)
T1589.002: Gather Victim Identity Information: Email Addresses; the entire chain starts here.
T1593.001: Search Open Websites/Domains: Social Media, Google Maps contributor profile, Google+ archive.
T1596.002: Search Open Technical Databases: WHOIS/Reverse lookups (adjacent), Epieos and Gravatar function as reverse-identifier lookup services in the same spirit.
For your OSINT methodology notes
Worth keeping as a repeatable pivot sequence for any email-first OSINT task:
Epieos (or similar) → check Google account linkage, Maps reviews, calendar exposure.
Gravatar hash lookup (MD5 of lowercased, trimmed email) → check for avatar/profile existence via the current API version.
Wayback Machine on any historical profile URLs surfaced above.
Reverse image search on any recovered avatar to find reused instances elsewhere.
About the author
- Software Developer | Learning Cybersecurity | Open for roles * If you're in the early stages of your career in software development (student or still looking for an entry-level role) and in need of mentorship, you can reach out to me.
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