# TryHackMe SOC Simulator: Phishing Triage Writeup (TheTryDaily)

## Overview

Four alerts fired at TheTryDaily within six minutes on the morning of 16 Nov 2026. Three were true positives, and one was a false positive; all four were classified correctly. No alert needed escalation, because the one phishing link a user clicked was blocked at the firewall.

The scenario tests one skill above all: correlating alerts from different data sources. The firewall alert (8816) only tells the full story once it is matched to the phishing email that delivered the link (8815).

| Alert | Rule | Severity | Verdict | Escalated |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 8814 | Inbound Email Containing Suspicious External Link | Medium | False positive | No |
| 8815 | Inbound Email Containing Suspicious External Link | Medium | True positive | No |
| 8816 | Access to Blacklisted External URL Blocked by Firewall | High | True positive | No |
| 8817 | Inbound Email Containing Suspicious External Link | Medium | True positive | No |

## Timeline

The whole incident chain played out in 5 minutes 31 seconds. The key link is the 74 seconds between the fake Amazon email reaching h.harris and the blocked click from h.harris's workstation.

| Time (16 Nov 2026) | Event | Alert | Verdict |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 06:59:40 | HR onboarding email from onboarding@hrconnex.thm delivered to j.garcia | 8814 | False positive |
| 07:02:53 | Fake Amazon delivery email with a [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) link delivered to h.harris | 8815 | True positive |
| 07:04:07 | h.harris's workstation requests the same [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) link; blocked by the firewall | 8816 | True positive |
| 07:05:11 | Microsoft typosquat phishing email delivered to c.allen; no click observed | 8817 | True positive |

## Alert 8814: HR onboarding email (false positive)

A legitimate onboarding email from an HR vendor tripped the same rule as the real phishing emails. It is the decoy in this scenario.

**Alert details:** Inbound Email Containing Suspicious External Link, Medium. Sender `onboarding@hrconnex.thm`, recipient `j.garcia@thetrydaily.thm`, subject "Action Required: Finalize Your Onboarding Profile", no attachment.

**Time of activity:** 16 Nov 2026, 06:59:40 (alert raised 07:01)

**List of Affected Entities:**

- Recipient: `j.garcia@thetrydaily.thm`
- Sender: `onboarding@hrconnex.thm`
- URL: `hxxps://hrconnex[.]thm/onboarding/15400654060/j.garcia`

**Reason for Classifying as False Positive:** The sender domain matches the link domain, and the link uses HTTPS with a path personalised to the recipient. The email has no attachment, no spoofing, no look-alike domain, and no URL shortener. Its content fits a normal new-hire onboarding workflow. The alert fired on generic traits (an external link and an "Action Required" subject), not on any malicious indicator. Firewall logs show no blocked or suspicious connections to hrconnex.thm.

**Reason for Escalating the Alert:** Escalation is not required. This is benign onboarding communication.

**Recommended Remediation Actions:**

- No remediation needed for the email
- Confirm with HR that hrconnex.thm is an approved vendor and consider allowlisting it
- Tune the rule so trusted vendor domains don't alert on "Action Required" subjects alone

**List of Attack Indicators:** None identified.

## Alert 8815: fake Amazon delivery email (true positive)

This delivery-failure lure impersonated Amazon, and h.harris clicked its link 74 seconds after it arrived. The firewall blocked the click (alert 8816).

**Alert details:** Inbound Email Containing Suspicious External Link, Medium. Sender `urgents@amazon.biz`, recipient `h.harris@thetrydaily.thm`, subject "Your Amazon Package Couldn't Be Delivered – Action Required", no attachment. The body contains a [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) short link.

**Time of activity:**

- 16 Nov 2026, 07:02:53: phishing email delivered to h.harris
- 16 Nov 2026, 07:04:07: link clicked from h.harris's workstation, blocked by the firewall (alert 8816)

**List of Affected Entities:**

- Recipient: `h.harris@thetrydaily.thm`
- Host: h.harris's workstation (tied to the email by the identical URL and the 74-second gap)
- Sender: `urgents@amazon.biz`
- URL: `hxxp://bit[.]ly/3sHkX3da12340`

**Reason for Classifying as True Positive:**

- The sender domain [amazon.biz](http://amazon.biz) is not an Amazon domain; Amazon uses [amazon.com](http://amazon.com) and regional domains
- The greeting is the generic "Dear Customer", not the recipient's name
- A 48-hour deadline creates urgency
- The request to "confirm shipping information" is a pretext for harvesting personal and payment data
- The link is hidden behind a [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) shortener over plain HTTP, and VirusTotal flags it as phishing/malicious

Firewall logs show h.harris's workstation requesting this exact URL 74 seconds after delivery, which confirms that the user interacted with the email.

**Reason for Escalating the Alert:** Escalation is not required. The user clicked the link, but the firewall blocked the connection, so the phishing page never loaded and nothing could have been submitted. No further connections from the workstation to the phishing infrastructure were found, and no other recipients were identified.

**Recommended Remediation Actions:**

- Purge the email from h.harris's mailbox and any others that received it
- Block the sender and the domain [amazon.biz](http://amazon.biz) at the email gateway
- Expand the [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) link in a sandbox and block the final landing domain
- Tell h.harris they clicked a phishing link and give targeted awareness training
- Flag or sandbox external emails that contain URL shorteners

**List of Attack Indicators:**

- Sender: `urgents@amazon[.]biz` (impersonates Amazon)
- URL: `hxxp://bit[.]ly/3sHkX3da12340` (VirusTotal: phishing/malicious)
- Subject: "Your Amazon Package Couldn't Be Delivered – Action Required"
- Related alert: 8816

## Alert 8816: blocked access to the phishing link (true positive)

h.harris's host tried to open the [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) link from alert 8815, and the firewall's "Blocked Websites" rule stopped it. The control worked, but the attempt was real, so this is a true positive and not a benign alert.

**Alert details:** Access to Blacklisted External URL Blocked by Firewall, High. Source: h.harris's workstation; destination: a Bitly server on port 80 (TCP, web-browsing); action: blocked.

**Time of activity:** 16 Nov 2026, 07:04:07 (alert raised 07:06), 74 seconds after the phishing email in 8815 was delivered

**List of Affected Entities:**

- Host: h.harris's workstation
- User: `h.harris@thetrydaily.thm`, recipient of the phishing email in 8815
- Destination: Bitly URL-shortening service, port 80
- URL: `hxxp://bit[.]ly/3sHkX3da12340`

**Reason for Classifying as True Positive:** The host made an outbound request to a [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) link that VirusTotal flags as phishing/malicious. The same URL appears in the fake Amazon email delivered to h.harris 74 seconds earlier (8815), which ties the request to that user clicking the link. The destination IP belongs to Bitly's own infrastructure; the malicious content sits behind the redirect.

**Reason for Escalating the Alert:** Escalation is not required. The firewall blocked the request, so the host never reached the redirect target. Splunk showed no further connections from the workstation to the phishing infrastructure over HTTP or HTTPS, and no follow-on activity such as downloads or process execution.

**Recommended Remediation Actions:**

- Purge the delivering email (8815) and block its sender
- Expand the short link in a sandbox and block the final landing domain
- Don't block Bitly's IP: it is shared infrastructure
- Notify h.harris and provide phishing-awareness guidance
- Monitor h.harris's workstation for further attempts to reach the URL or related domains

**List of Attack Indicators:**

- URL: `hxxp://bit[.]ly/3sHkX3da12340` (VirusTotal: phishing/malicious)
- Destination: Bitly URL-shortening service (shared infrastructure)
- Firewall rule triggered: Blocked Websites
- Related alert: 8815

## Alert 8817: Microsoft typosquat email (true positive)

This credential-phishing email impersonated Microsoft account security using a typosquatted domain. It was delivered, but no endpoint tried to reach the phishing site.

**Alert details:** Inbound Email Containing Suspicious External Link, Medium. Sender `no-reply@m1crosoftsupport.co`, recipient `c.allen@thetrydaily.thm`, subject "Unusual Sign-In Activity on Your Microsoft Account", no attachment. The "Review Activity" link points to the typosquat domain's /login page.

**Time of activity:** 16 Nov 2026, 07:05:11 (alert raised 07:07)

**List of Affected Entities:**

- Recipient: `c.allen@thetrydaily.thm`
- Sender: `no-reply@m1crosoftsupport.co`
- URL: `hxxps://m1crosoftsupport[.]co/login`

**Reason for Classifying as True Positive:**

- [m1crosoftsupport.co](http://m1crosoftsupport.co) is a typosquat: "1" replaces "i", on an unrelated .co domain Microsoft doesn't use
- A fake "unusual sign-in" alert, with a foreign location (Lagos, Nigeria) and an IP address, is used to alarm the reader and look credible
- "Secure your account immediately" creates urgency
- The link leads to a /login page, the classic credential-harvesting pattern, and its text "Review Activity" hides a non-Microsoft destination

Firewall logs show no connection attempts from any endpoint to [m1crosoftsupport.co](http://m1crosoftsupport.co).

**Reason for Escalating the Alert:** Escalation is not required. There is no evidence that c.allen clicked the link or visited the phishing domain, so no credentials were exposed.

**Recommended Remediation Actions:**

- Purge the email from c.allen's mailbox and any others that received it
- Block the sender and [m1crosoftsupport.co](http://m1crosoftsupport.co) at the email gateway and the firewall/proxy
- Remind c.allen to check account alerts only through the official Microsoft portal
- Search for other emails from this domain or similar look-alikes
- Enable look-alike domain detection at the email gateway

**List of Attack Indicators:**

- Sender: `no-reply@m1crosoftsupport[.]co`
- URL: `hxxps://m1crosoftsupport[.]co/login`
- Domain: `m1crosoftsupport[.]co` (typosquat of Microsoft)
- Subject: "Unusual Sign-In Activity on Your Microsoft Account"

The Lagos location and IP address in the email body are bait, not attacker infrastructure, so they aren't listed as indicators.

## Results and feedback

All four alerts were classified correctly, finishing 1st with 1005 points (+300). The simulator's verdict: "Victory! Security breach prevented!"

| Alert | Type | Time to resolve | Classification |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 8814 | Phishing | 7.43 min | Correct (FP) |
| 8815 | Phishing | 8.27 min | Correct (TP) |
| 8816 | Firewall | 6.48 min | Correct (TP) |
| 8817 | Phishing | 4.1 min | Correct (TP) |

True positive and false positive identification rates were both 100%, with a mean time to resolve of 7 minutes. Phishing alerts took the longest to close. The headline "60% true positive rate" and the 30-minute mean dwell time don't match the per-alert figures, so they likely use a different scope or unit.

The AI review praised the report structure, entity identification, reasoning and remediation steps. It flagged two gaps:

- **The "who" was missing from the firewall report.** The original 8816 report left the user behind the source host unconfirmed. The version above fixes that by tying the host to h.harris.
- **The sequence of events wasn't tied together across reports.** The timeline section and the cross-references between 8815 and 8816 address this.

## Lessons learned

The biggest takeaway: an alert from one data source rarely tells the whole story, so correlate before closing it.

1. **Correlate across data sources.** The firewall log showed what happened and from where; the email showed how and to whom. Matching the identical URL and the 74-second gap turned two alerts into one incident.
2. **Pin the "who" to the "where".** An IP address is not a person. Every report should name the user behind a host, even when the link is inferred from timing, and say how it was established.
3. **The same rule can produce opposite verdicts.** 8814 and 8817 fired on identical logic. What separated them: whether the sender domain matched the link domain, typosquatting, the tone of the lure, and personalisation.
4. **URL shorteners hide the destination and borrow trust.** [bit.ly](http://bit.ly) has a high reputation, so filters let it through. Expand the link and block the landing domain, never Bitly's IP, which would break legitimate traffic.
5. **Blocked still counts as a true positive.** A working control means the threat was contained, not that the alert was benign. Containment is what decides escalation.
6. **Bait details are not indicators.** The Lagos location and IP in 8817 were part of the lure, so blocking them achieves nothing.
